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Abstract
We present SymNet, a network static analysis tool based on
symbolic execution. SymNet quickly analyzes networks by
injecting symbolic packets and tracing their path through the
network. Our key novelty is SEFL, a language we designed
for network processing that is symbolic-execution friendly.
SymNet is easy to use: we have developed parsers that
automatically generate SEFL models from router and switch
tables, firewall configurations and arbitrary Click modular
router configurations. Most of our models are exact and have
optimal branching factor. Finally, we built a testing tool that
checks SEFL models conform to the real implementation.
SymNet can check networks containing routers with hun-
dreds of thousands of prefixes and NATs in seconds, while
ensuring packet header memory-safety and capturing net-
work functionality such as dynamic tunneling, stateful pro-
cessing and encryption. We used SymNet to debug middle-
box interactions documented in the literature, to check our
department’s network and the Stanford backbone network.
Results show that symbolic execution is fast and more accu-
rate than existing static analysis tools.
1. INTRODUCTION
Modern networks deploy a mix of traditional switches and
routers alongside more complex network functions includ-
ing security appliances, NATs and tunnel endpoints. Under-
standing end-to-end properties such as TCP reachability is
difficult before deploying the network configuration, and de-
ployment can disrupt live traffic. Static analysis of network
dataplanes allows cheap, fast and exhaustive verification of
deployed networks for packet reachability, absence of loops,
bidirectional forwarding, etc. All static analysis tools take as
input a model of each network box processing, the links be-
tween boxes and a snapshot of the forwarding state, and are
able to answer queries about the network without resorting
to dynamic testing [19, 10, 15, 16, 17].
What is the best modeling language for networks? If pos-
sible, we should simply use the implementation of network
boxes (e.g. a C program), as this is the most accurate and is
easiest to use. If we view packets as variables being passed
between different network boxes, static network analysis be-
comes akin to software testing. This is a problem that has
been studied for decades, and the leading approach is to use
symbolic execution [3].
Symbolic execution is really powerful: it explores all pos-
sible paths through the program, providing possible values
for each (symbolic) variable at every point. In the context of
static network analysis, the power of symbolic execution lies
in its ability to relate the outgoing packets to the incoming
ones: even if all the incoming packet headers are unknown,
a symbolic execution engine can detect which header fields
are allowed in each part of the network, which ones are in-
variant, and can tell how the modified headers depend on the
input when they are changed. Unfortunately, symbolic exe-
cution scales poorly: its complexity is roughly exponential
in the number of branching instructions (e.g. “if” condition-
als) in the analyzed program. Applying symbolic execution
to actual network code quickly leads to untenable execution
times, as shown in [6]. To cut complexity, we must run sym-
bolic execution on models of the code, rather than the code
itself. While it is natural to program the models also in C, as
previous works do [6, 1], we show that C is fundamentally
ill suited for network symbolic execution, and the resulting
models are too complex to analyze.
We propose the Symbolic Execution Friendly Language
(SEFL, §4), a network modeling language that we have de-
veloped from scratch to enable fast symbolic execution. We
have also developed SymNet (§5), a tool that performs sym-
bolic execution on SEFL models of network boxes. Using
SymNet and SEFL, we show it is possible to run symbolic
execution on large networks to understand network proper-
ties beyond simple packet reachability: safety of tunnel con-
figurations, MTU issues and stateful processing (§8.4).
The remaining challenge is to accurately model network
functionality in SEFL; this process requires expert input. We
have developed parsers that take switch MAC tables, router
forwarding tables or CISCO firewall configurations (adap-
tive security appliance) and automatically generate the cor-
responding SEFL models. Additionally, we have manually
modeled a large subset of the elements from the Click modu-
lar router suite [13]: given a Click configuration we can au-
tomatically generate the corresponding model. Finally, we
have developed a testing tool that takes SEFL models and
their runnable counterparts and automatically checks that the
model conforms to the actual implementation.
To evaluate SymNet , we have applied symbolic execu-
tion to understand documented middlebox interactions[14],
to check our department’s network and the Stanford back-
bone. Results show that SymNet is more powerful than ex-
isting static analysis tools, captures most real-life interac-
tions in networks, with runtimes in the order of seconds.
2. MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
Static analysis tools are enticing because they can help
network operators understand the operation of their deployed
networks and they can inform the correct deployment of up-
dates. Static network analysis is maturing: tools such as
Header Space Analysis [10] and Network Optimized Dat-
1
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
02
84
7v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 11
 A
pr
 20
16
alog [15] have evolved from research and are now being
rolled into production. However, all existing tools have lim-
itations (see §9 for details), as they choose different points in
the tradeoff between the expressiveness of the policy speci-
fication language, the network modeling language, the ease
of modeling and the checking speed. Furthermore, existing
tools can’t model widely used functions such as dynamic
tunneling and encryption.
In this section we discuss three examples of network func-
tionalities we want to statically analyze and highlight the dif-
ficulty in using existing tools for this purpose.
Modeling tunnels. Various forms of tunneling are in wide-
spread use, sometimes deployed by different parties. Can
we statically verify that such tunnels work correctly? We
provide a simple example below, where E1 and E2 perform
IP-in-IP encapsulation and D1 and D2 decapsulation.
A→ E1→ E2 −→ D2→ D1→ B
Consider Header Space Analysis [10] (HSA), the most
mature network static analysis tool today. With HSA, the
packet header is modeled as a sequence of bits, where each
bit can take values 0,1 or * (don’t care). Network functions
are modeled as transformations of the packet header. For
instance, the IP-in-IP encapsulation could be modeled as a
20 byte shifting of existing bits to the right and adding the
new IP header in the remaining space; the decapsulation will
perform the inverse operation. Beyond reachability, we want
to statically answer the following basic question: are packet
contents invariant across this tunnel? The answer is obvi-
ously yes, but HSA cannot capture it: if the input header
contains only * bits, the output will also contain * bits, but
this does not imply that individual packet contents may not
change. We can always feed a specific packet to the model
and check it is not modified, but to ensure the invariant holds
in general we must try all possible packets—this won’t scale.
A symbolic packet is needed instead—if the symbolic packet
doesn’t change, the property holds regardless of its value.
We have also modeled the simple tunnel using the newer
Network Optimized Datalog tool [15]. NOD can compute
the invariant, but modeling is cumbersome and limiting in
many ways. First, the models for D1 and D2 differ, despite
the fact they are running the same operation. D2 takes a
packet with six header fields (to “remember” the two layers
of encapsulation): we cannot reuse the D1 model for D2,
nor the one from E1 for E2: we need to create a new model
instead. In fact, network models in NOD depend not only
on the processing of the box, but also the network topol-
ogy and the processing of other boxes. Additionally, mod-
els for boxes operating at a lower stack level must also in-
clude higher level protocol headers: for instance, a router
will model not only its use of the layer 3 fields, but also
the upper layer protocols such TCP, UDP or ICMP. In sum-
mary, NOD modeling is extremely cumbersome when net-
work topologies are heterogeneous and run multiple proto-
cols; this is not an issue for datacenters where NOD’s usage
Length 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of paths 3 8 19 45 106 248 510
Runtime (s) 0.2 3 20 109 501 2000 9500
Table 1: Runtime of Klee on options parsing code.
is targeted, but will be a major issue in the wider Internet.
Classic symbolic execution can be used to elegantly capture
the properties of tunnels, as we show in §7. Unfortunately,
running existing symbolic execution tools such as Klee [3]
on the source code of network boxes results in intractably
long runtimes and memory usage. We now discuss a series
of examples that highlight these difficulties.
Dobrescu et al [6] show that symbolically executing an IP
router implemented in C quickly becomes intractable: when
a packet with a symbolic destination address reaches the
router, the branching factor is at least as large as the number
of prefixes. Such branching is prohibitive when analyzing
core routers that have hundreds of thousands of prefixes in
their forwarding tables.
To make symbolic execution tractable, we would like the
branching factor to depend on the number of links of the
router instead; this is feasible, but we must write an opti-
mized router model for symbolic execution (see §7).
Parsing TCP Options. Assume a network operator has de-
ployed a stateful firewall and wishes to know what options
are allowed through in its current configuration; in partic-
ular, it wishes to understand whether a new IETF transport
protocol might work in its network.
In Figure 1 we show a C code snippet taken from a fire-
wall that processes the TCP options header field. The op-
tions field is accessible via the options character array,
and contains length bytes. The middlebox we show al-
lows a number of widely used TCP options, and drops all
other options by replacing them with padding.
HSA or NOD can’t model this example, but the operator
could run klee on the middlebox code instead, providing a
symbolic options field. By examining the options field
after the firewall code, the operator can tell which options
are allowed through and which not. In Table 1 we present
the number of resulting paths and runtime of klee, as we vary
the length parameter whose max value is 40. The results in
Table 1 show just how costly symbolic execution on C code
is, even on fairly simple code snippets.
2.1 Towards a Solution
When applying symbolic execution to C code, the number
of branches in the code exponentially increases the number
of paths to be explored. To make symbolic execution feasi-
ble, we need to drastically simplify the code being symboli-
cally executed. Unfolding loops and executing both branches
of an “if” instruction are techniques that reduce the complex-
ity of symbolic execution at the cost of increased runtime
[18]. Such techniques, together with simpler data structures
allow verifying small pipelines of Click modular router ele-
ments in tens of minutes, as shown by Dobrescu et al. [6].
Our target scale is two orders of magnitude higher: we
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unsigned char *ptr = &options[0];
unsigned char opcode,opsize;
while (length > 0) {
opcode = *ptr;
switch (opcode) {
case TCPOPT_EOL: return True;
case TCPOPT_NOP:
length--;ptr++;continue;
default:
opsize = *(ptr+1);
if ((opsize < 2) || (opsize > length)){
//nop everything!
for (i=0;i<length;i++)
ptr[i] = 1;
length = 0;
continue;
}
switch(_options[opcode]){
case DROP: return False;
case ALLOW: break;
case STRIP:
for (i=0;i<opsize;i++)
ptr[i] = 1;
}
}
ptr+=opsize;length-=opsize;
}
Figure 1: TCP Options processing code for a CISCO ASA
box with default configuration.
aim to verify networks containing hundreds or more ele-
ments in seconds. Ideally, the number of paths explored
by symbolic execution should be comparable to the num-
ber of paths in the network; in other words, the model of
any network box should not produce more paths than the
number of outgoing links from that box; for instance, in the
TCP options code in Figure 1, we should have one or two
paths at most. This property would make symbolic execu-
tion tractable even on very large networks.
To achieve this target, we rely on the key observation that
each path in network symbolic execution must be tied to an
active packet passing through the network: if a codepath
does not result in packets, it should not be symbolically ex-
ecuted. This implies that models of network boxes should
only focus on the paths that decide the fate of packets, leav-
ing out any logging, reporting, system checks, and so forth.
The C language does not have this property: a packet
is just one of many variables handled by the program, and
dropping a packet does not stop the execution of the box.
Another fundamental problem is the poor handling of data
structures, as shown in our TCP options example.
3. DESIGN OVERVIEW
We take a radically different approach to enable large scale
symbolic execution. We need a new verification-driven mod-
eling language that is imperative —thus easier to program
with—and that allows us to harness networking domain knowl-
edge to simplify, as much as possible, the task of the sym-
bolic execution engine. To this end, we have designed a
novel language called SEFL that makes it possible to con-
sider symbolic execution as part of modeling rather than see-
ing it as a retrospective verification and validation activity.
A major design question regards the way packets are mod-
eled. With Header Space Analysis, headers have a fixed size,
and all possible layers have to be present at all time. This is
fine for L2 boxes (such as Openflow switches), but won’t
work in large, heterogeneous networks. Network Optimized
Datalog models packets as a collection of independent “vari-
ables”; it can capture tunnels to some extent, but it does not
capture the physical layout of packets, and the problems that
encapsulation may bring (e.g. interpreting the wrong part of
the header, not knowing the higher level protocol, etc.).
SEFL uses a packet layout that mimics real implementa-
tions. As in NOD, packet headers are variables, but each
header has an absolute offset at which it is allocated. All
SEFL headers must be allocated individually, and alloca-
tion and deallocation commands include the explicit size of
the header field; no symbolic sizes are allowed to ensure
tractability. Accesses to header fields must be aligned, other-
wise errors are thrown. SEFL thus offers guaranteed memory
safety for packet headers and simplifies the symbolic execu-
tion engine which must not test for memory errors.
By design, in SEFL a packet is tied to an execution path,
and we use the terms path and packet interchangeably in
this document. When constraints applied to header fields
are unsatisfiable, the execution path fails altogether. This is
in contrast with C where a packet header is just a regular
variable and execution of a path terminates only on program
exit. SEFL incorporates the following features:
• Built-in map data structure. SymNet offers a map
datastructure that SEFL programs can use to create or
retrieve values based on concrete string keys. The map
helps programmers avoid implementing complex data
structures and their associated branching factor (such
as those in Fig. 1).
• Bounded loops. The only loop instruction supported
by SEFL is an iteration over s snapshot of the keys in
the native map data structure. This loop can therefore
be unfolded and executed without any branching.
• Dedicated path control instructions. SEFL allows
the user to explicitly drop a packet (path) based on its
contents without any branching. Multiple execution
paths can be explicitly created with fork.
SEFL-coded models are by construction memory safe, have
bounded memory usage and are guaranteed to terminate.
4. SEFL LANGUAGE
In table 2 we list all the instructions provided by SEFL, to-
gether with their parameters and description. Every instruc-
tion implicitly takes as parameter the current execution state
(i.e. packet) and outputs a new execution state. The state
includes header variables and map entries (called metadata)
together with their values and constraints.
The Allocate and Deallocate instructions create
both header fields and metadata, depending on the param-
eter provided. If v is a string, the variable is metadata and
is not aligned in any way, and memory safety checks do not
apply. v acts as a key in the map managed by SymNet. If v
is an integer (or an expression that evaluates to an integer), it
is treated like a header with the associated memory checks.
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Instruction Description
Allocate(v[,s,m]) Allocates new stack for variable v, of size s. If v is a string, the allocation is handled as metadata
and the optional m parameter controls its visibility: it can be global (default) or local to the current
module. If v is an integer it is allocated in the packet header at the given address; size is mandatory.
Deallocate(v[,s]) Destroys the topmost stack of variable v; if provided, the size s is checked against the allocated size
of v. The execution path fails when the sizes differ or there is no stack allocated for variable v.
Assign(v,e) Symbolically evaluates expression e and assigns the result to variable v. All constraints applying to
variable v in the current execution path are cleared.
CreateTag(t,e) Creates tag t and sets its value e, where e must evaluate to a concrete integer value.
DestroyTag(t) Destroys tag t.
Constrain(v,cond) Ensures that variable v always satisfies expression cond. The execution path fails if it doesn’t.
Fail(msg) Stops the current path and prints message msg to the console.
If (cond,i1,i2) Two execution paths are created; the first one executes i1 as long as cond holds. the second path
executes i2 as long as the negation of cond holds.
For (v in regex,instr) Binds v to all map keys that match regex and executes instruction instr for each match.
Forward(i) Forwards this packet to output port i.
Fork(i1,i2,i3,...) Duplicates the packet and forwards a copy to each output port i1, i2, ...
InstructionBlock(i,...) Groups a number of instructions that are executed in order.
NoOp Does nothing.
Figure 2: SEFL instruction set.
To simplify access to header fields and to enable layering,
any number of tags can be defined. The programmer can
use indexed addressing based on the tags and a fixed offset
rather than absolute addresses to access a header field.
SEFL has instructions to manipulate tags. New tags can
be created at absolute values (used when the packet is cre-
ated), or relative to other tags (used for encapsulation of an
existing packet). Tags can be defined dynamically, pointing
to addresses where layer two, three and four headers start.
The code below performs IP header encapsulation:
CreateTag("L3",Tag("L4")-160)
Allocate(Tag("L3")+96,32) //IP src
Assign(Tag("L3")+96,
ipToNumber("192.168.1.1"))
Allocate(IpDst,32) //IP dst
Assign(IpDst,ipToNumber("8.8.8.8"))
The notation to access the IP source address field is rather
wordy. To make programming easier, we have defined short-
hands for all header fields that we work with: Tag("L3")+96
becomes IpSrc. The code to initialize the destination ad-
dress field uses this shorthand, and is also easier to read. The
decapsulation code does the opposite: first, header fields are
deallocated then the L3 tag is destroyed.
SEFL includes two instructions that constrain the execu-
tion of the current path, that have no direct correspondent
in C. Fail stops the current execution path and prints an
error message. Constrain applies a constraint to a vari-
able, stopping the current path if the constraint does not
hold. Constrain allows programmers to model filtering
behaviour without branching. Below we show the SEFL and
C code to drop non-HTTP packets.
Constrain(TcpDst==80) if (p->dst_port==80)
free(p);
The C code results in two execution paths if the dst port field
is symbolic, while SEFL only adds the TcpDsp==80 con-
straint to the current path.
If forks the current execution state. On one path, it ap-
plies the constraint and executes instr1. On the “else”
branch is applies the negated constraint and executes instr2.
If more than one instruction must be executed on any branch,
an InstructionBlock should be used that groups more
instructions into a single compound instruction. If any branch
is empty, NoOp can be used instead.
For iterates over the keys in the map that match a given
pattern. The code does not branch: a snapshot of the keys is
taken and the loop is unfolded before execution.
5. SYMBOLIC EXECUTION
Our symbolic execution tool is called SymNet and con-
sists of 15KLOC of Scala code. To analize a network con-
figuration, SymNet requires as input the descriptions of all
the network elements and their connections. Each network
element has input and output ports, as shown in Fig. 3: input
ports are shown with a triangle and output ports are shown
as rectangles. Connections are unidirectional from output to
input ports, so we need two pairs of ports and two links for
bidirectional connectivity. Providing a model for a network
element means specifying the number of inputs and output
ports and associating a set of SEFL instructions to each port.
SymNet starts execution by creating an initial empty packet,
with no header fields or metadata, and then executes code to
create a symbolic packet of the given type (e.g. TCP). The
packet is injected into an input port specified by the user,
e.g. port 0 of element A in Fig.3, where SymNet executes
the associated instructions.
SymNet instructions take as input an execution path and
can modify its associated state, spawn new execution paths
or both. The instructions on port 0 may forward the packet
to one of the output ports by using the forward or fork
instructions. After the output port instructions are executed,
if the state is feasible and there is an outgoing link from the
output port, the packet is processed at the next input port.
Values in SymNet can be concrete or symbolic; each value
has a unique identifier. For each value, on each path, Sym-
Net holds a list of constraints that apply to that value. As-
4
0	  
0	  
1	  
1	  
2	  
{…}	  
{...}	  	  
{…}	  
{…}	  
{…}	  
Element	  A	  
0	  0	  
Element	  B	  
Figure 3: Network model
with two elements.
Packet	  1	   Packet	  2	  	  Element	  A	  model	  	  
	  InputPort(*):	  
	  	  Constrain(IPDst==141.85.37.1),	  
	  	  If	  (Constrain(TcpDst===123),	  
	  InstructionBlock(	  
	  	  	  	  Assign(IPDst,192.168.1.100),	  
	  	  	  	  Assign(TcpDst,22),	  
	  	  	  	  Forward(OutputPort(1))	  
	  ),	  
	  Forward(OutputPort(2)),	  
	  
IpDst=*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  TcpDst=*	  
IpDst=141…	  TcpDst=*	  
IpDst=141…TcpDst=123	  IpDst=141,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  TcpDst	  <>	  123	  
IpDst=192…TcpDst=123	  
IpDst=192…TcpDst=22	  
CrtPort	  =	  Out(1)	  
CrtPort	  =	  Out(2)	  
Figure 4: Symbolic execution with SymNet . The tool keeps a per-path
value stack and assignment history for each variable.
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Figure 5: Loop detection
algorithm example.
signment operations modify the top of the current value stack.
A path finishes execution when the Fail instruction is called,
when a constraint does not hold on any of its variables, or
when it reaches a port with no outgoing links.
SymNet enhances general purpose symbolic execution in
two major ways. First, the state contains the map that stores
variable names (or memory addresses) as keys and their as-
sociated value stacks, instead of simple values. Allocation
and deallocation instructions push and pop a whole value
stack. This allows programmers to quickly “mask” the cur-
rent value of a variable and restore it later with ease. Sec-
ondly, SymNet keeps a complete history of the values asso-
ciated with a symbol which allows it to detect network-wide
loops and to check for field invariance across network hops.
SymNet is also considerably simpler than tools like Klee:
it does not use heuristics to prioritize paths to explore be-
cause our target is finding all the possible execution paths
through the network, not just covering all instructions of
the network model with at least one execution path. Ad-
ditionally, SymNet (via SEFL) only supports simple expres-
sions (referencing, subtraction, addition, negation), and this
greatly reduces state representation complexity.
To better understand SymNet execution, look at the toy
example in Figure 4 showing an implementation of port for-
warding in element A. The code is executed when packet 1
reaches any of the input ports of A. The packet enters with
header fields IpDst and TcpDst set to symbolic values.
The constrain instruction forces packets to be destined
to a specific IP address. The If instruction then creates an-
other packet, packet 2. All the state of packet 1 is repli-
cated to packet 2 (in fact, it is shared with a copy-on-write
mechanism). Next, packet 1 gets the TcpDst==123 con-
straint added and checked by a constraint solver (Z3 [5], in
our case). The constraint is satisfiable, so packet 1 is prop-
agated further to the assignment instructions which rewrite
both the destination address and ports of the packet before
forwarding it to output port 0. Packet 1 is now done and
SymNet will return to Path 2, first adding the negated con-
straint TcpDst!=123 and then asking the solver if it is sat-
isfiable. The packet goes to output port 2 and to element B
(port 0).
6. NETWORK VERIFICATION
Reachability. It is straightforward to check reachability in a
network modeled with SEFL. A symbolic packet is injected
at the desired source port, and this packet is then propagated
through the network by SymNet . At each port reached by
the symbolic packet, we can inspect the values of and con-
straints on the header variables to discover which packets are
allowed, what input packets can reach the output, and how
the packets look like at the output, on all the execution paths
that reach that port.
In the example in Figure 4, a single path reaches output
port 1. By examining the history of this path, we can con-
clude the port is reachable only when the incoming packet
satisfies TcpDst==123, and the outgoing packet will have
its destination address and port overwritten. Output port 2 is
also reachable by packets that satisfy TcpDst!=123.
Loop detection. The loop detection algorithm relies on the
reachability algorithm and we run it at every port in the net-
work. When a new port is visited, we save the current ex-
ecution state (all variables and all constraints). When the
same port is revisited, the current state of each variable is
compared to all its previous states.
Figure 5 shows how the current state compares to the old
ones. A loop exists only when the new state contains all
possible values in the old state (case (d) in the figure). Say
the set of all constraints for the old state is o, and for the new
state is n. To check for loops, we invoke the solver with the
constraint !n & o. In Fig.5, this constraint asks the solver
to find a point included in the old state that is not contained
in the new state. If the solver returns an example, there is no
loop, otherwise a loop exists. In our figure, the solver will
find counter-examples for cases (a)-(c), but not for (d).
The loop detection algorithm is generic and can capture
different kinds of loops. If we apply it to the entire state,
the algorithm will not capture traditional forwarding loops
because the TTL field will always decrease and thus the state
will be different. To capture such loops, we must apply the
same algorithm but only consider destination and source IP
addresses when comparing states.
SEFL models (programs) are inherently bounded in space
- there is no recursion or heap allocation. We have also
proven that all SEFL programs have bounded execution. Loops
can only appear as a result of the network topology, but are
captured by our loop detection algorithm.
Invariants. By checking the value stack of the destination
address field on output port 2, we find that it is bound to
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Figure 6: SymNet packet modeling uses the same physical
layout as real packets.
the same symbolic value that was set when the path entered
the input port. In Fig. 4 the TcpDst and IpDst fields are
invariant on path 2 as long as TcpDst!=123.
Header visibility. By analyzing the value stack of a header
field at an intermediate point, we can understand whether
the value read is the same as that set by the source or seen
by the destination. Visibility tests allow us to check whether
firewalls and endhosts see the same headers.
Header memory safety. When creating or destroying header
fields, accesses are indexed through tags. If the tags are set
incorrectly, of if the program wrongly assumes the location
of headers, the execution path will fail. This has allowed us
to catch various encapsulation problems in buggy models.
7. MODELING NETWORKS WITH SEFL
We begin with more detail on how we model packets in
Figure 6. At the top of the Figure a TCP packet is encapsu-
lated with IP and Ethernet headers. Packets always have the
Start and End tags set; all the other tags are set as packets
move through the (modeled) stack. Layer tags are always al-
located relative to other tags; the start and end tags start at 0
by convention when a symbolic packet is created. The bot-
tom packet in Figure 6 is an IP-in-IP encapsulated packet.
The L4 tag is not set in this case; this will be set only in the
IP decapsulation code. Any accesses to L4 fields before the
L4 tag will fail, stopping the associated path. SEFL network
models support protocol layering natively, shielding lower
layer models from semantics higher up the stack.
The code below models a packet received from an Ether-
net network interface; it first sets the L2 tag and only allows
IP packets destined for a certain MAC address. Once the L2
tag is set, the L3 tag can be set by adding 112 bits to it:
InputPort(0):
CreateTag("L2",Tag("Start"))
Constrain(EtherDst,==00:aa:00:aa:00:aa)
Constrain(EtherProto,==0x0800)
CreateTag("L3",Tag("L2")+112)
Forward(OutputPort(1))
Modeling switch behaviour. To model switches, we have
written a parser that takes a snapshot of CISCO switch MAC
tables (containing MAC, VLAN and output port tuples) and
creates a SEFL model. To reduce branching, our model sim-
ply groups all MAC addresses that should be forwarded on
the same output port in a single constraint. A possible switch
model is the one below which we call “ingress” because the
filtering code is applied on the input ports:
InputPort(*):
If (Constrain(EtherDst==MAC11 |
EtherDst==MAC12 | ... ),
Forward(OutputPort(1)),
If (Constrain(EtherDst==MAC21 |
EtherDst==MAC22 | ... ),
Forward(OutputPort(2)),
Fail("Mac unknown")))
When we run the code above with a symbolic EtherDst,
it will result in as many execution paths as the number of
output ports of the switch, which is optimal. However, it
will generate more constraints than needed: a path taking an
else branch will include the negated constraints for the if
branch together with the constraints for the current output
port. To avoid these additional constraints, we can write the
switch using an egress filtering model:
InputPort(*):
Fork(OutputPort(1),OutputPort(2),...)
OutputPort(1):
Constrain(EtherDst==MAC11 | MAC12 ...)
OutputPort(2):
Constrain(EtherDst==MAC21 | MAC22 ...)
The egress model has both optimal branching and a mini-
mum number of constraints. The egress models is correct as
long as the constraints are mutually exclusive, which always
holds for MAC tables due to the spanning tree algorithm.
Modeling an IP Router. At first sight, it seems we should
be able to use the same approach to model an IP router, but
this is not true in the following forwarding table:
Prefix Output Interface
192.168.0.1/32 → If0
10.0.0.0/8 → If0
192.168.0.0/24 → If1
10.10.0.1/32 → If1
If we simply group the rules per output interface and apply
them using If instructions in the order above, the resulting
forwarding will not use longest prefix match for destination
address 10.10.0.1, which will be forwarded wrongly on If0.
The most obvious solution is to have one If instruction for
each prefix and ensure that for all overlapping prefixes, more
specific matches are checked first. However, this creates as
many branches as the number of prefixes in the routing table.
In our example we would have four branches, but for core
routers this means hundreds of thousands of branches.
A better algorithm is the following. If prefix a is more
specific than prefix b, create the following constraint for b:
!a & b. This ensures that the more specific prefix a does
not match. We can now group all rules that have the same
output interface as in the switch case; the number of result-
ing paths drops from the number of prefixes to the number
of links of the router, which is again optimal. We also rely
on egress filtering to reduce the number of constraints.
Modeling a Network Address Translator. NATs are ubi-
quiously deployed as operators come to grips with the IPv4
address space shortage. NATs modify the source IP address
and source port for outgoing packets and apply the reverse
mapping for incoming packets. NATs are harder to model:
they keep per flow state to ensure incoming traffic is only
allowed if it is related to outgoing traffic the NAT has seen.
In addition, the list of available ports at a NAT is a global
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variable, and the port assigned to a new connection will de-
pend on many external factors, such as the number of active
connections, the random number generator, and so forth.
To model the NAT we observe that the exact port number
assigned by the NAT is quasi-random, and network operators
treat it as such. Therefore it makes no sense to model the
algorithm used to choose a port for a new connection; this
would simply not scale. Instead, the newly mapped port will
be a symbolic variable with allowed values in the NAT’s port
range. To make the NAT “remember” a mapping for the
flow, we save the NAT state using metadata:
InputPort(0):
Constrain(IPProto,==6) //only do TCP
Allocate("orig-ip",32,local)
Allocate("orig-port",16,local)
Allocate("new-ip",32,local)
Allocate("new-port",16,local)
Assign("orig-ip",IpSrc) //save initial addr
Assign("orig-port",TCPSrc) //save initial port
Assign(IpSrc,"...") //perform mapping
Assign(TcpSrc, SymbolicValue())
Assign("new-ip",IpSrc) //save assigned addr
Assign("new-port",TcpSrc) //save assigned port
Forward(OutputPort(0))
On the return path, the code restores the original mappings
only if the metadata is present and matches the mapping the
NAT has assigned to this flow:
InputPort(1):
Constrain(IPProto,==6)
Constrain(IpDst,=="new-ip")
Constrain(TcpDst,=="new-port")
Assign(IpDst,"orig-ip")
Assign(TcpDst, "orig-port")
Forward(OutputPort(1))
The NAT uses local metadata to ensure that multiple in-
stances of the code can be run cascaded. Local metadata
will ensure each NAT instance stores and retrieves its own
values. Our NAT does not create any branches - the return
packet is allowed if it contains the mapping, or dropped oth-
erwise. The NAT code is a faithful model of the real thing.
The technique we used to model the NAT—storing per
flow state inside the packet—we also used to model other
similar boxes including stateful firewalls and firewalls that
randomize the initial sequence number of TCP connections.
The same technique can be applied wherever the per-flow
state is independent across flows. Under this (admittedly
strong) assumption, symbolic execution can verify large net-
works with stateful middleboxes without state explosion.
Modeling TCP options parsing. Our models for routers
and switches are exact—there is no simplification compared
to the real code as our model accurately mimics the behaviour
of the code. To make the options parsing code symbolic-
execution friendly though, we need to simplify it. The main
problem with that code is that it includes a for loop with an
unknown number of iterations, and the code has branches in
the loop body. Simplifying the code means we cannot cap-
ture all the properties of the original code.
To understand the difference in properties that can be proven
on the original C code and our SEFL model, we have per-
Assign("OPT30",ConstantValue(0)),
If (Constrain(TcpDst==80),Assign("OPT4",0),NoOp),
Assign("OPT2",1),
Assign("SIZE2",4),
If (Constrain("VAL2">1380),Assign("VAL2",1380),NoOp)
Figure 7: ASA options parsing code modeled in SEFL.
formed a thorough analysis in §8.2. We find that traditional
symbolic execution can prove memory safety and bounded
execution on the real code, albeit only on a small subset
of inputs. When answering higher level questions such as
“which options are allowed through?”, the answers can be
wrong because only a small part of the options field can be
checked in reasonable time.
We create a model of the options parsing code that is
amenable to fast symbolic execution. It is based on the ob-
servation that the order in which options are placed in the
options field does not matter —the code allows known op-
tions and strips everything else. This suggests that we can
modify the list data structure with SymNet’s in-built map.
More concretely, each possible TCP option x (where x is in
between 2 and 255) will have a corresponding metadata vari-
able called “OPTx” that can take values 1 or 0, modeling
whether that TCP option is enabled or not.The option length
and body will be held in metadata variables “SIZEx” and
“VALx” respectively. In a sense, our model pre-parses the
byte representation of the options and stores it in the packet
metadata, allowing quick access to the options.
A snippet of the firewall options code is given in Figure 7.
Stripping options is simply a matter of setting the associated
metadata to 0, regardless of the initial value—hence the is
no branching involved. The SACK OK is stripped only for
HTTP traffic. The code then always sets the MSS option,
and rewrites its value to be at most 1380.
Our model can accurately tell which options are allowed
through and under what circumstances. The code has few
branches and is thus cheap to symbolically execute, and cap-
tures more properties than Klee on the C code (see §8.2).
Modeling Encryption. Encrypted tunnels are being deployed
more and more. We need to capture two properties: first, no
network box can read the original contents of the payload
once it is encrypted. Secondly, if we decrypt using the same
key that was used for encryption, we will retrieve the orig-
inal payload. As in the NAT case, predicting the way the
ciphertext will look is not important for our model. All that
matters is that the original content is not available after en-
cryption. We could use the following code snippet to encrypt
with key K, where K is a parameter.
InputPort(0):
Allocate("Key")
Assign("Key",K)
Allocate(TcpPayload)
Assign(TcpPayload,SymbolicVariable)
Forward(OutputPort(0))
The decryption only proceeds if the key matches:
InputPort(0):
Constrain("Key",==K)
Deallocate(TcpPayload)
Forward(OutputPort(0))
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Despite its simplicity, the code above has the two prop-
erties we seek. Any box reading the TCP payload after en-
cryption will only see a novel unbounded symbolic variable,
not the original contents. Only using the proper decryption
key will retrieve the original contents.
7.1 Ready-made network models
Writing models in SEFL requires expert input. It cannot
be reasonably assumed that network administrators have the
time or the expertise needed to perform this task, yet they are
the main beneficiaries of the tool. To make SymNet easily
usable, we have created parsers that take configuration pa-
rameters and/or runtime information from well known net-
work elements and output corresponding SEFL models. All
the user has to do is place all these files in a single directory,
together with a file describing the links between the boxes.
Then, the user can run SymNet by specifying an input port
to start the reachability and loop detection analysis.
The output of the tool is the list of explored paths in json
format. For every path SymNet lists all variables and their
constraints at the end of the execution as well as all the in-
structions and ports this path has visited. The user can check
these paths either manually or with standard tools (e.g. grep)
to see if certain undesired paths have been visited, etc.
Switches and routers. SymNet generates models from snap-
shots of switch MAC or router forwarding tables.
Click modular router configurations. We have modeled
in SEFL a large subset of the elements of the Click modular
router. This exercise has served two main purposes: first, it
allowed us to understand whether SEFL’s limited instruction
set is sufficient to model a wide range of functionality. Sec-
ond, we use the Click elements to build more complex boxes
such as firewalls, NATs and even a CISCO application secu-
rity appliance. Our parser takes the Click configuration file,
generates a model for each individual element and then con-
nects these models according to the config file.
Openstack Neutron configurations. Openstack Neutron
allows cloud tenants to specify at an abstract level the net-
working configuration of their VMs before they are instanti-
ated. Users can specify firewalls, router configurations, vir-
tual links, etc. We have written an Openstack plugin that
takes the router and firewall configurations and translates
them into SEFL models. These could be used to check reach-
ability before deployment, or to check that the actual deploy-
ment matches the user’s intent; we are still working on inte-
grating the results from symbolic execution back into Neu-
tron to make it easily available to the users.
7.2 Modeling a CISCO ASA
To analyze our department’s network, we must model its
core device: a Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance)
5510 firewall, henceforth called ASA. It combines basic layer-
2 capabilities such as switching and VLAN segmentation,
with static & dynamic NAT and stateful packet inspection
and filtering. How the latter is achieved, and the internal cui-
sine of the inspection process is the major challenge in accu-
rately modeling ASA behavior. For instance, by default, the
ASA will intercept TCP connections, and act as server until
the connection is actually established. This feature protects
machines behind the ASA from TCP SYN floods. However,
documentation is very sparse and generic, making it difficult
to understand the exact behaviour.
To understand how the ASA processes traffic, we devel-
oped a “black-box” testing environment, using the same ASA
model. We connected the real ASA to two machines, gener-
ically termed outside and inside. Using Click, we ran test
sequences consisting in TCP, UDP, ICMP and simple (raw)
IP packets, through the ASA and observed the outputs.
The next step is to generate the model. We could gener-
ate SEFL directly, however SEFL is not executable in prac-
tice. We chose to generate a Click configuration that models
the ASA instead. SymNet can execute this configuration be-
cause it has models for each element; the bonus of Click
modeling is that we can potentially run the ASA in software,
by simply instantiating it. After weeks of black box testing,
we implemented a tool that parses the ASA configuration
file and generates a Click ASA model automatically. We ex-
perimented with different ASA configurations produced by
our tool, running the same test sequences through the real
ASA, as well as the Click model. The default ASA configu-
ration includes static and dynamic NAT, traffic filtering and
basic TCP protocol inspection. Our model captures layer 2
and 3 behaviour, NATs. The Click configuration uses stan-
dard elements, with the exception of a new element called
TCPOptions which implements the options filtering code.
The resulting (simplified) Click packet pipeline can be
summarized as follows: (i) ingress static nat: if the packet
matches an incoming static NAT rule, then it is modified ac-
cordingly; no state is preserved for such packets, (ii) TCP in-
spection: if the packet is the response of an active TCP con-
nection, it is forwarded to destination directly, and appropri-
ate dynamic NAT rules applied, if this is the case; otherwise
(iii) filtering: appropriate filtering rules are applied; (iv) TCP
connections are stored, and dynamic NAT mappings are in-
serted, for TCP packets; finally (v) egress static nat: if the
packet matches an outgoing static NAT rule, then it is ap-
plied. Finally, all TCP packets are parsed by the TCPOptions
element with code very similar to that in Fig.1.
8. EVALUATION
Our evaluation has two major parts. First, we want to un-
derstand whether our approach tailoring network models for
symbolic execution pays dividents in terms of runtime and
accuracy. Secondly, we wish to understand whether sym-
bolic execution can help us find new types of bugs not cap-
tured by existing tools such as HSA or NOD. We explore
two network deployments: our department’s network con-
taining a Cisco middlebox, one router and 15 switches and
an enterprise middlebox deployment [14].
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8.1 Performance evaluation
We ran experiments using our SymNet prototype on a
quad-core Intel i5 machine with 8GB of RAM, testing mod-
els of network functionalities such as routers, switches, fire-
walls, options parsing and Click elements.
Symbolic execution of a switch model. We used a snap-
shot of the MAC table of the core switch in our department
network (see Fig 11) with four hundred entries to model its
behaviour. We built three models of the switch:
• Basic: a lookup table, with one entry per MAC, ap-
plied on ingress. This is the same as running a generic
symbolic execution tool on switch forwarding code.
• Ingress: group MACs going to the same output port,
apply filtering and take switch decision on input.
• Egress: fork traffic to all outgoing ports and apply per-
port restrictions on egress.
We inject a packet with a symbolic destination MAC ad-
dress and execute the switch code and forward all the re-
sulting paths on the corresponding output ports. We mea-
sure wall-clock execution time and the number of paths, time
spent in and number of calls to the constraint solver.
Figure 8 plots the SymNet runtime as we increase the
number of MACs from 440 to 500,000.To generate more en-
tries in the MAC table, we duplicate existing entries as many
times as needed; each entry gets a unique destination MAC
address. In all tests, more than 90% of time is spent in Z3.
The basic model generates as many paths as entries in the
lookup table. Each path will have its own instance of the
solver and a set of constraints, and this has a large memory
overhead: it takes 10 seconds to execute a 1000-entry MAC
table, and close to 8GB of RAM. Beyond this size, the RAM
on our machine is insufficient.
The ingress model groups MAC addresses by output port,
and results in as many paths as output ports in use on our
switch (20). However, the path constraints are quite com-
plex: the first path will contain the allowed MACs, the sec-
ond path will contain its own allowed MACs and the negated
constraints on the first path, and so forth. In fact, the total
number of constraints grows quadratically with the number
of switch ports: it takes 2 minutes to symbolically execute a
switch code with 480,000 entries.
The egress model also groups MACs per output port, but
avoids the negation by forking the initial flow and applying
the constraints independently on each port. In this case the
total number of constraints is the same as the number of en-
tries, and this gives a big benefit in runtime: it takes only 5s
to execute 480 thousand entries. This is the switch model we
use in the remainder of our evaluation.
Router. We used a publicly available snapshot of the for-
warding table of a core router containing 188.500 entries
[8]. We generated the model by checking for overlapping
prefixes and adding constraints to ensure the per-port con-
straints are mutually exclusive: this results in 183000 ad-
ditional constraints to a total of 371.000 prefix checks (or
722.000 inequalities). Model generation takes 8 minutes.
We run tests with 1%, 33% and 100% of the prefixes by
injecting an IP packet with a symbolic destination IP address
into the three models: basic, ingress and egress. We provide
the results in Table 2. The basic model only copes with 1%
of prefixes; the ingress one also works on 33% of the prefixes
but not 100%. The egress model is faster than both, and can
also symbolically execute the full router in around 18s.
Performance comparison to existing tools. We seek to un-
derstand how SymNet performance compares to HSA, the
most efficient static analysis tool today. We use the Stanford
backbone network data [10] and run reachability from an ac-
cess router to all core routers with both SymNet and HSA.
The results are given in table 3 and show that SymNet is
within 50% of the execution time of HSA, despite its power.
In comparison, NOD is reported to be 20 times slower than
HSA [15] on the same benchmark.
8.2 Coverage analysis of TCP options code
What properties can Klee symbolic execution capture on
ASA options parsing C code, and what can SymNet do on
the SEFL model? We stop the tools after one hour.
We ran experiments by creating a TCP packet with a sym-
bolic options field and the length field set to a concrete value.
We then process this packet with the options parsing code.
Finally, we iterate the options field afterwards, printing a
message if a specific TCP option is present. A list of the
properties captured by Klee and SymNet is given in Table 4.
Table 1 in §2 shows that Klee symbolic execution on the C
code takes more than 30 mins for only 6B of options. When
options length is less than or equal to six, Klee proves that
the parsing code is memory safe, guaranteed to terminate,
and correctly accounts for options with invalid length. It
also shows that the MSS, SackOK and WScale options are
allowed alone or pairwise but not all three simultaneously.
Klees reports that timestamp and multipath options are not
allowed. Unfortunately, these last results are wrong when
we allow full-size options: the timestamp option is allowed
through when the options field is large enough to contain it.
To conclude, Klee testing can give wrong results when used
on small options fields, and can’t be run on large ones.
SymNet runs the options code in 1s. It cannot capture
memory safety and bounded execution properties of the C
code, but ensures the model itself is memory safe and runs
in bounded time by construction. It correctly captures all
other properties, showing that the multipath option is always
stripped, the MSS option is always added even if it is not
present in the original packet, and that all allowed options
are permitted in any combination.
SymNet achieves these results by ignoring the ordering of
options and by using an abstract representation. However,
ordering matters in the options parsing code: when an option
has invalid format (e.g. wrong size), the code will replace
all remaining bytes with NOPs, thus stripping options stored
after the invalid one. The SymNet model simply marks all
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Figure 8: Symbolic execution of different
switch models.
Prefixes Basic Ingress Egress
1600 25s 2.1s 0.4s
62500 DNF 23.1s 5.6s
188500 DNF DNF 18s
Table 2: Core router analysis.
HSA SymNet
Generation Time 3.2min 8.1min
Runtime 24s 37s
Table 3: Comparison to HSA
Property Klee SymNet
Runtime 1h 1s
Bounded execution yes upto 6B no
Memory safety yes upto 6B no
Invalid Length yes upto 6B less precise
SackOK,MSS,WScale yes upto 6B yes
Timestamp,Multipath incorrect yes
Combinations of options incorrect yes
Table 4: Comparison between Klee and
SymNet on TCP options firewall code.
existing options in the packet as possibly removed by setting
their corresponding OPT variables to new symbolic values.
8.3 Automated testing
SEFL models can be checked quickly, but they are only
useful as long as they accurately reflect the processing per-
formed by the baseline code they mimic. As modeling is
manual, inadvertent errors may be introduced.
To catch such bugs, we have developed an automated test-
ing framework that compares the model to the actual imple-
mentation (be it a Click configuration or a hardware appli-
ance). Our automated tool is similar in principle to ATPG
[20] and proceeds in the following steps:
1. We run a reachability test over the SEFL model, with
a TCP/IP packet with symbolic fields. The output is
a series of paths, where each path places a number of
constraints on the header fields of the injected packet.
2. Pick an unexplored execution path and use Z3 and the
path constraints to generate concrete values for all the
header fields, resulting in a concrete packet p.
3. Packet p is injected into the running code (either the
Click modular router instance or the hardware ASA
box). The outputs are captured with tcpdump. We use
a 1s timeout for tcpdump—if no packets are received,
we conclude there is no packet reachable on output.
4. The header values from the captured packet are added
as constraints at the end of the symbolic execution path.
Z3 is used to check if the constraints hold; if they do
not, an error report is generated.
5. Repeat from step 2, as long as there are unexplored
symbolic execution paths.
6. Generate random header fields and repeat from step 3.
Our testing procedure first explores all paths resulting from
symbolic execution, and then tests random inputs until the
user stops the testing procedure. We deployed our tool on
three machines in our local testbed: one machine generates
packets according to specification, sends them to the middle
machine running the code under test which sends its output
to a third machine where packets are captured. The middle
machine ran Click modular router configurations for most of
our tests, with one exception: when testing the ASA box we
replaced the middle machine with real ASA hardware con-
figured the same way as our department’s firewall. We have
used testing extensively while writing our models, and it has
helped us catch a series of interesting bugs, discussed below.
IPMirror. This Click element mirrors the IP source and des-
tination addresses and transport level ports. Our model was
incomplete: it only mirrored the IP addresses and not ports.
DecIPTTL. This element decrements the IP TTL and drops
packets with TTL 0. The original code decreased the TTL
and then constrained its value to be positive. SymNet re-
ported a single execution path instead of the two we ex-
pected. This was a bug because the TTL is an unsigned
value: when the TTL was 0 decrementing it would result
in wrap-around to the higher possible TTL value, and the
packet would never be dropped. The obvious fix was to place
the constraint TTL ≥ 1 first, then decrement the TTL.
HostEtherFilter only allows packets destined to a MAC ad-
dress, and we were wrongly checking the ethertype field.
IPClassifier takes an input packets and forwards them on
one of the output ports if the packet matching the corre-
sponding filter. To test the classifier, we generated multi-
ple instances using different filters and different number of
output ports. We then took each instance and tested it, one
output port at a time, discarding all packets from the other
output ports. We found a bug where the solver was gener-
ating 0 values for several header fields (e.g. port number)
and these where correctly dropped by Click. To solve this
issue, we had to constrain our symbolic packet to ensure IP
addresses and port numbers were valid.
IPRewriter is the Click element that allows the implementa-
tion of stateful functionality such as NATs and stateful fire-
walls. In our setup, the element acts as a stateful firewall
where traffic from the inside network arrives on input port 0
and outside traffic arrives on input port 1 (Fig. 9).
To test the rewriter using our unidirectional testing setup
we use the setup shown in Figure 9 to testing connections
initiated from the inside in setup (a) or the outside in setup
(b). In setup (a) we model return traffic by bouncing traffic
via an IPMirror element. On output port 0 we should observe
a packet with reversed IP addresses and transport ports.
When we ran SymNet we found the loop shown in Fig.9.(a’):
with symbolic packets it is possible that the source and des-
tination addresses and ports are identical and the traffic re-
turned from the IPMirror matches the forward mapping and
exits again on output port 0. The solution was to constrain
the source and destination IPs to be different.
ASA model. We tested the ASA model against the ASA
hardware extensively, uncovering several bugs in the pro-
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Figure 9: Testing a stateful firewall
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Figure 11: CS Department network mod-
eled in SEFL and verified with SymNet
cess. A bug in the VLAN and ethernet decapsulation code
resulted in all packets being dropped at ASA ingress. Sec-
ondly, we found that the ASA correctly allowed traffic from
the higher-priority office VLAN to the lab VLAN, but wrongly
dropped the return traffic. We fixed it by enhancing the ASA
to behave as a stateful firewall for office to lab traffic.
8.4 Functional Evaluation
What type of properties beyond basic IP or layer two reach-
ability can SymNet verify that are useful in practice? To be-
gin answering this question, we turn to recent work by Le
et al. that describes operational experiences learned while
deploying a Split TCP middlebox in ten enterprise networks
serving thousands of users [14]. We have modeled in SEFL
the network topology that Split TCP uses (Figure 10). The
Split TCP Proxy is deployed adjacent to router R3 which is
configured to redirect traffic coming from both directions to
P by rewriting the destination MAC address of the packet.
Our model faithfully mimicks packet processing along the
whole path, including Ethernet header encapsulation and de-
capsulation at each hop, routing and filtering. Can SymNet
discover issues that appeared in production deployment?
Asymmetric routing. We run a reachability check from C
to R2, and at R2 we use IPMirror to send the traffic back to
C. SymNet shows that all execution paths from C to R2 and
reverse cross via P, thus the setup is correct.
MTU issues. Router R1 is configured to drop all packets
with size large than 1536B. We inject a symbolic packet at
C with a symbolic IP length field. At R2, the IP length field
has a constraint attached: length < 1536.
Next, we use IP-in-IP tunneling for traffic between R1 and
P. This further reduces the available MTU, and was creating
difficult to debug performance problems in the actual de-
ployment: ping and TCP connection setup worked fine, but
subsequent full MTU traffic from the client was blackholed
because they exceed the MTU after encapsulation [14]. Run-
ning reachability on this new setup, the new constraint ap-
plied to length becomes: length + 20 < 1536: the client
MTU must be smaller than 1516B.
Missing VLAN tagging. In one setup, P was removing
VLAN tags before processing packets, and was not adding
them back before pushing packets back ro R1. This caused
R1 to drop those packets because it was expecting VLAN
tagging [14]. A simple reachability check quickly highlights
this problem: when R1 attempts to remove the VLAN tag-
ging it finds the wrong EtherType and drops the packet.
Security Appliance. In one deployment, R2 acted as a DHCP
server too, and it filtered packets where the Ethernet source
address, IP source address tuple was not in its assigned leases.
We modeled the DHCP assignment by using two metadata
variables set by C: origIP and origEther. Both were
set by the source to have the same symbolic value as the Eth-
ernet and IP source address fields in the symbolic packet. R2
filters all packets where origIP!=pSrc or origEther
!= EtherSrc. We ran reachability again finding all pack-
ets were dropped by R2 because the source MAC was being
modified by P and the second constraint didn’t hold.
8.5 Verifying the CS Department Network
We have generated an accurate model of our department’s
network using switch MAC tables, router forwarding tables
and a Click configuration mimicking the ASA box. The
slightly simplified topology is given in Figure 11: all hosts
are connected to local switches which connect to an aggrega-
tion switch. The aggregation switch connects to M2 master
switch that connects to a Cisco ASA box and M1, the CS de-
partment router. L2 routing is used in most of the network:
the access switches tag the traffic coming from the hosts as
lab traffic (VLAN 304) or office traffic (VLAN 302). These
are carried on trunk links all the way to the ASA box which
is the first IP hop. A management VLAN is also configured
with all switches having an interface in it. A single server
called “hole” and located in the cluster has an interface in
this VLAN and is used by our admin for management pur-
poses. The network has 21 devices with 235 connected net-
work ports. The combined MAC tables have 6000 entries,
and there are 400 routing table entries.
Injecting a purely symbolic packet in the office takes 42s
and results in 3000 paths: results show that the Internet and
the labs VLAN are reachable via the ASA box. If we special-
ize the packet to have a source address in the office VLAN
and a destination address in the Internet the number of valid
paths drops to 50 and execution takes just 10 seconds. Next,
we check TCP connectivity by further specializing the packet
(IPProto field is set to 6) and adding an IPMirror element to
the exit router port; this takes 1s and results in 8 valid paths.
TCP reachability is allowed, but the output shows that
TCP options are tampered with: SACK is disabled for HTTP
traffic (OPT5 is set to 0), and MPTCP options are removed.
Our admin had no idea of this behaviour, which was enabled
by the default ASA configuration.
Next, we checked inbound reachability by injecting a purely
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HSA[10] AntEater NOD Panda SymNet
Reachability X X X X X
Invariants 7 X X X X
Header visibility 7 X X X X
Memory correctness 7 7 7 7 X
Scalability high low med low high
Model independence X X 7 X X
IP router X X X X X
Dynamic tunneling 7 7 7 7 X
TCP options 7 7 X 7 X
Dynamic NATs 7 7 X X X
Encryption 7 7 7 7 X
TCP Segment splitting 7 7 7 7 7
IP Fragmentation 7 7 7 7 7
Table 5: SymNet vs. other network verification tools.
symbolic packet at the exit router. This took 2s and resulted
in 221 paths, out of which 30 were successful. Most paths
were ended at the ASA box which appears to be config-
ured correctly. However, symbolic execution showed that
the management VLAN, with private 192.168.137.0/24 ad-
dresses, was accessible via router M1. A quick check on
the live router showed the behaviour was true, but is it ex-
ploitable? Our ISP does not forward such traffic towards to
our network. We ran another reachability test from the clus-
ter and found that any machine from the cluster can access
any of the switches, and verified manually that from the clus-
ter we could indeed telnet into all the switches. As all of our
students have accounts in the cluster, this is a major security
risk. We have announced it to our admins and they promptly
fixed it by updating the static routes at M2.
9. RELATED WORK
Static network analysis is a well-established topic, with
many available tools [19, 10, 16, 15, 17]. AntEater [16]
models network boxes as boolean formulae.Network Opti-
mized Datalog [15] is the most complete tool to date and
relies on Datalog both for network models and policy con-
straints. The work of Panda et al. uses a model checker to
verify networks containing stateful middleboxes [17]. Our
NAT model is similar in spirit with their proposal.
In table 5 we provide a qualitative comparison of the most
relevant network verification tools, finding that memory cor-
rectness is a differentiating feature of SymNet . We catego-
rize the scalability of the tools by analyzing their runtime on
enterprise-sized networks, as reported in the original papers.
High scalability means runtimes of seconds, medium is min-
utes, while low means runtimes of hours. HSA scales very
well but it does not capture many properties. SymNet scales
very well on our optimized models; in general, though, its
complexity can quickly run out of control if the models ver-
ified are poorly written or have inherently many branches.
Model independence means a box’s model is independent
of its location in the network. NOD is the only tool that
doesn’t have this property, which makes modeling very dif-
ficult especially in heterogenous networks.
Finally, we review widely-deployed network functionali-
ties that we should statically verify. SymNet has the biggest
coverage, however it cannot model packet splitting or coa-
lescing (see our discussion of limitations in §10).
Symbolic execution. We are not the first to propose using
symbolic execution to analyze networks. Dobrescu et al. [6]
used symbolic execution to check selected Click elements’
source code for bugs, aiming to proove crash-freedom and
bounded execution. We have shown that using C as mod-
elling language does not scale, and have proposed SEFL and
SymNet as scalable alternatives.
Online verification. Veriflow [11] and NetPlumber [9] aim
to perform live validation of all network configuration changes.
They work underneath an SDN controller and verify all state
updates. NICE uses symbolic model checking to verify the
correctness of Openflow programs [4]. More recently, Arm-
strong [1] use Klee on middlebox models written in C to
guide the generation of test packets for networks. SymNet is
orthogonal to these works.
NetKAT[2] and Frenetic [7] are novel specification lan-
guages optimized for specifying OpenFlow-like rules in net-
works. SEFL is strictly more general as it can model mid-
dlebox behaviours too, not just layer two behaviour.
10. LIMITATIONS
Using SymNet for network analysis is powerful but has a
few notable limitations which we discuss here. Packet pro-
cessing is sequential, and the network boxes only do process-
ing when they receive packets. This problem is not unique
to SymNet : it is a general limitation of applying symbolic
execution to network analysis. Parallel processing is akin to
symbolic execution of multi-threaded programs, and is sig-
nificantly harder because it must check all possible interleav-
ings of the different threads [12].
A single packet is active in the network at any one time.
This implies that processing that works across multiple pack-
ets, such as TCP segment splitting or coalescing, cannot be
modelled. This only limits the number of in-flight pack-
ets, not the number of total packets: our TCP sender model
works with a window of one packet because of this limita-
tion, but any number of round-trip times can be simulated.
11. CONCLUSIONS
Symbolic execution is a powerful tool for network veri-
fication, but applying it to production networks is challeng-
ing.To allow scalable network symbolic execution we have
proposed SEFL, a novel, minimalist, imperative language
tailored by design for network symbolic execution. We have
built SymNet , a fast symbolic execution tool for SEFL code.
To understand the expressiveness of SEFL, we have mod-
eled many networking devices ranging from switches and
routers to middleboxes that keep flow state and parse TCP
options. We have also modeled a large subset of the ele-
ments of the Click modular router, which allows us to verify
Click configurations out-of-the box. Our evaluation shows
that our models have near-optimal branching factors per box
and that SymNet seamlessly scales to large networks.
Finally, we have used SymNet to capture a number of
middlebox behaviours described in the literature and in our
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own department’s network. Our experience shows that Sym-
Net catches many interesting network properties and is fast.
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